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Abstract In the recent literature there has been some debate between advocates of
deflationist and fictionalist positions in metaontology. The purpose of this paper is
to advance the debate by reconsidering one objection presented by Amie
Thomasson against fictionalist strategies in metaontology. The objection can be
reconstructed in the following way. Fictionalists need to distinguish between the
literal and the real content of sentences belonging to certain areas of discourse. In
order to make that distinction, they need to assign different truth-conditions to the
real and the literal content. But it is hard to see what more is required for the literal
content to be true than for the real content to be true. So, fictionalism is an
unsatisfactory position. Here I offer a novel reply to Thomasson’s challenge. I argue
that the literal and the real content need not be distinguished in terms of their truth-
conditions; rather, they can be distinguished in terms of their different subject-
matters, leaving it open whether their truth-conditions coincide or not. I explain how
replying to Thomasson’s objection is crucial for deepening our understanding of
fictionalist strategies in metaontology.
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1 Introduction
The debate between platonists and nominalists in the philosophy of mathematics
concerns the existence of abstract mathematical objects such as numbers and sets.
Platonists argue that they exist, nominalists argue that they don’t exist.
One could wonder why the existence of numbers is subject to debate. Consider
the argument:
(1) The number of dragons = 0, therefore:
(2) there are numbers (there is at least one number, namely 0).
The premise of the argument (1) looks like an uncontroversial claim and the
conclusion (2) follows by existential generalization from (1). So, why can’t we
settle the debate about the existence of numbers by appealing to such a simple
argument?
The version of hermeneutic fictionalism developed by Yablo
(2001, 2002, 2005, 2010) is an answer to the question why the felt-truth of claims
like (1) does not settle the issue of the existence of numbers.1 The real content of a
typical utterance of a sentence like (1) is, according to hermeneutic fictionalists,
different from its literal content (also called the ‘‘full’’ content of the sentence). The
literal content of (1) is that there are no dragons and there is a number, the number 0,
that counts how many dragons there are. The real content of (1) is that there are no
dragons. The literal content of (1) entails the existence of the number 0, whereas its
real content does not: the real content of (1) is that there are no dragons and that is
what ordinary speakers assert when uttering (1). (1) sounds uncontroversial because
its real content is uncontroversial; but the real content of (1) does not entail (2)—
only the literal content does.
Recently, Amie Thomasson has challenged the hermeneutic fictionalist’s
distinction between real and literal content. Thomasson contends that fictionalists
incur a certain ‘‘argumentative debt’’: they ought to make sense of the idea that
‘‘there is something more it would take for the ontological claim [i.e. the literal
content] to be literally true than for the undisputed claim [i.e. the real content] to be
true’’ (Thomasson 2013, p. 1039).
The objection is put forward in the context of a defense of ontological
deflationism, a meta-ontological account alternative to fictionalism, which accepts
‘easy’ arguments for the existence of numbers. Easy arguments for the existence of
numbers add one step to our argument 1–2.
(0) There are no dragons, therefore
(1) the number of dragons = 0, therefore
(2) there are numbers (i.e. there is at least one number, namely 0).
The passage from (0) to (1) is justified by appeal to a rule that allows us to transform
claims of the form ‘‘there are n Fs’’ into claims of the form ‘‘the number of the Fs is
1 Here I will focus on fictionalist accounts of number-talk. Fictionalist strategies can also be applied to
other areas of discourse, like property-talk, proposition-talk, etc. Similarly, deflationists have proposed
‘easy’ arguments for the existence of those allegedly problematic entities.
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N’’. Rules of this kind are called transformation rules. They should be accepted by
competent speakers of English because they are ‘‘rules of use that introduce the new
terms to our vocabulary, just as legal definitions may introduce technical terms for
(legal) marriage’’ (Thomasson 2013, p. 1036). According to the deflationist,
someone accepting 0 but rejecting 1 displays a lack of competence in the use of the
expression ‘the number of’ (see Contessa 2016, p. 764).
In this paper I reply to Thomasson’s objection, showing how the fictionalist can
distinguish between literal and real content without committing herself to the view
that the literal content is a stronger proposition than the real content. I also argue
that my discussion of Thomasson’s objection helps us deepening our understanding
of fictionalist accounts of mathematical discourse.
I proceed as follows: Sect. 1 introduces fictionalist accounts of mathematical
discourse; Sects. 2 and 3 review Thomasson’s objection and some of the existing
proposals for answering her challenge; in Sect. 4 I develop my novel reply to
Thomasson’s challenge. In Sect. 5 I consider a possible worry about my strategy
and reply to it and in Sect. 6 I explain how my reply to Thomasson’s objection helps
to deepen our understanding of fictionalist accounts of mathematics.
2 Hermeneutic fictionalism
Hermeneutic fictionalism is presented by Yablo (2010, p. 3) as a thesis about the
content of typical utterances of applied mathematical sentences:
(HF) In a typical utterance of a mathematical sentence S, speakers do not
assert the full content of S, |S|, but only its concrete content ||S||.
The concrete content of ||S|| is defined in this way (Yablo 2010, p. 6):
(Concrete-Content) ||S|| is the proposition true in a world w iff S is true in a
world w* that is concretely indiscernible from w.
In the case where S = ‘‘#dragons = 0’’ the full content of S is that there is a number
numbering how many dragons there are and that number is 0. If w is a world in
which there are no dragons and no numbers, the full content of S, |S|, is not true in
w, given that there are no numbers in w. Still, ||S|| is arguably true in w: on
reasonable assumptions, there is a possible world w* that is concretely indiscernible
from w and has numbers in it. In w* there are no dragons and there is a number
counting how many dragons are present in w*: hence, in w*, #dragons = 0, hence S
is true in w*. Given that S is true in w* and that w* is concretely indiscernible from
w, ||S|| is true in w.
(HF) vindicates the feeling that what is asserted by an ordinary utterance of a
sentence like ‘‘The number of dragons = 0’’ is uncontroversially true. The content
of an ordinary utterance of ‘‘#dragons = 0’’ is, according to hermeneutic
fictionalism, that there are no dragons, which is indeed an undisputed claim. (HF)
also vindicates the feeling that the question whether there are numbers is not settled
by our recognition that in ordinary circumstances speakers make a true claim when
uttering a sentence like ‘‘#dragons = 0’’. What is recognized as undisputed is that
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there are no dragons. The hermeneutic fictionalist maintains that from the fact that
there are no dragons it does not follow that numbers exist. The hermeneutic
fictionalist admits that the existence of numbers would follow from the truth of the
full content of a sentence like ‘‘#dragons = 0’’. But whether the full content of a
sentence like that is true is as controversial as the existence of numbers.
Summing up: according to hermeneutic fictionalism, the felt truth of ordinary
assertive utterances of applied mathematical sentences is due to the fact that their
real content is indeed uncontroversially true. This content, though, does not entail
that numbers exist. Hence, it is not inconsistent to assert that ‘‘#dragons = 0’’ but
refuse to assert that there are numbers.
3 Thomasson’s critique
The heart of (HF) is the distinction between literal and real content of applied
mathematical sentences. There is a sense in which it can be said that according to
(HF) speakers are committed only to the real content of typical utterances of
mathematical sentences: according to (HF) the real content is what is really asserted
whereas the literal content is what is quasi-asserted or, to use an older terminology,
‘‘put forward in a make-believe spirit’’ (Yablo 2001). In this sense, Thomasson is
right in claiming that, for (HF) to make sense:
there must be a difference between what we are committed to in merely
pretending that P, and what we would be committed to in really asserting that
P (p. 1034)
I presented the real and the literal content of S as propositions, conceived as sets of
possible worlds. For the two sets of worlds to be different, there must be one world
belonging to one set but not to the other. Indeed, in the example discussed in the
previous section, I claimed that there are worlds in which ||S|| is true but |S| is not—
worlds in which there are no dragons and no numbers, ‘‘nominalistic worlds’’, as I
am going to call them.
This invites an objection: which guarantee do we have that nominalistic worlds
are really acceptable? Perhaps, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, for the
number of dragons to be zero just is for there to be no dragons (Rayo 2013). If this
were the case, nominalistic worlds would be metaphysically impossible. Another
reason why nominalistic worlds could turn out to be impossible is the one advocated
by Thomasson: perhaps ‘‘there are no dragons’’ analytically entails ‘‘the number of
dragons is zero’’, in the same way as ‘‘there is an unmarried man’’ entails ‘‘there is a
bachelor’’.
If the possibility of distinguishing between real and literal content hinges upon
the legitimacy of assuming nominalistic worlds (worlds in which ||S|| is true but |S| is
not) it seems that the fictionalist incurs a
daunting argumentative debt […] he must hold that there is something more it
would take for the ontological claim to be literally true than for the undisputed
claim to be true, or else we cannot make sense of the idea that one can be
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committed to the real content without being committed to the literal content.
(Thomasson 2013, p. 1039)
Thomasson’s challenge to fictionalism is composed of two demands, which are
better presented as separate challenges:
(CH1) the fictionalist should explain what is the difference between the real and
the literal content of S;
(CH2) the fictionalist should explain the difference between a world in which the
literal content of S is true and a world in which the real content of S is true but its
literal content is not.
I am going to argue that fictionalists can answer CH1 without answering CH2, but
before coming to that it is worth examining attempts to answer both challenges at
once.
4 Standard replies to Thomasson’s critique
One reply to Thomasson’s critique is that the fictionalist can point out what more is
required for the truth of the literal content beyond the truth of the real content: the
existence of numbers. According to this line of response, in order for ‘‘The number
of dragons is zero’’ to be true in a world w two conditions must be met: (i) there
must be no dragons in w; (ii) there must be numbers in w. Worlds in which ||S|| is
true, but |S| is not, satisfy the first requirement, but not the second.
The fictionalist can simply reply that what it would take for there to really be
numbers is simply for there to be numbers—mind-independent, non-
spatiotemporally located, causally inert abstract objects that make arithmetical
truths true. (Contessa 2016, p. 771)
In a similar vein, Yablo (2014b) notes that there might well be no other way to
specify the extra condition that a world must meet in order to make the full content
of S true than to simply say that it has to contain numbers.
Contessa also mentions one reason to hold that (i) cannot entail (ii): ‘‘Hume’s
Dictum—i.e. the widely accepted metaphysical principle according to which there
are no necessary connections between distinct existences’’ (Contessa (2016), fn. 4).2
Thomasson (2016) replies that according to her favourite account (ontological
deflationism), the existence of numbers is not an extra condition, given that the rule
for the use of number terms allows us to transform the claim ‘‘there are n Fs’’ into
the claim ‘‘the number of the Fs is N’’, which in turn entails the existence of
numbers. So, on the deflationist account, every world satisfying condition (i) also
satisfies (ii). True, (ii) might not be a logical consequence of (i), but still it follows
2 Contessa is considering the case where S = ‘‘There are three apples on the table’’, but a similar point
can be applied also to our example.
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analytically from it. A world without dragons and without numbers is absurd for the
same reason why a world with an unmarried man but without a bachelor is absurd.
It is difficult to adjudicate the dialectic here. Thomasson challenges the
fictionalist to distinguish worlds in which only ||S||, but not |S|, is true; if the
fictionalist gives the obvious reply, that what makes a difference is the existence of
numbers, the reply is rejected for being incompatible with the deflationist account.
But this only shows that the fictionalist’s reply is unacceptable for the deflationist. It
does not show that it is unacceptable for somebody unpersuaded by the deflationist
account. In other words, it is difficult to say who is begging the question here: in
order to answer the challenge posed by the deflationist, the fictionalist seems to
presuppose the incorrectness of the deflationist account and in order to reject the
fictionalist reply the deflationist seems to presuppose the correctness of her
account.3
I want to propose a way out of this argumentative impasse. What is important for
the fictionalist is to distinguish the literal and the real content; this need not be done
by specifying worlds in which one is true but the other is not. In Sect. 2 I
distinguished two elements in Thomasson’s challenge to fictionalism:
(CH1) the fictionalist should explain what is the difference between the real and
the literal content of S;
(CH2) the fictionalist should explain the difference between a world in which the
literal content of S is true and a world in which the real content of S is true but its
literal content is not.
CH1 is a reasonable demand: if fictionalists want to appeal to a distinction between
real and literal content, they should make that distinction intelligible. But
fictionalists do not need to answer CH2 in order to answer CH1. It seems that
sentences can have different contents even if they are true at the same worlds:
‘‘Water = H2O’’ and ‘‘7 ? 5 = 12’’ are both true at the same worlds (all the
worlds), yet their content is different; so there seems to be room for making
distinctions between contents that are truth-conditionally equivalent.
Of course, this requires a conception of contents in which contents are not
propositions, i.e. sets of possible worlds. In the following, I will present a way of
conceiving the literal and the real content as directed propositions, i.e. propositions
coupled with a subject matter. This allows us to distinguish the literal and the real
content in terms of their subject matter rather than in terms of their truth conditions.
3 For the complaint that the deflationist is begging the question here, see Contessa (2016, pp. 768–769):
‘‘if anyone is begging the question here, it seems to be the deflationist, who claims that […] [sentences
like ‘‘there are three apples on the table’’] already carry a commitment to numbers despite the fact that all
other parties to this debate, including heavy-duty realists, see it otherwise and despite the fact that the
deflationist herself has not given us any plausible, non-circular reason to think so.’’
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5 A different reply
I am going to propose a different reply to Thomasson’s critique. The chief virtue of
this reply is that it does not beg the question against the deflationist: this reply to
Thomasson’s challenge would work even if the deflationist account of mathematical
discourse were correct.
Let me illustrate the general idea before getting into the details. Suppose I am
interested in three issues:
(1) Whether there are any dragons.
(2) Whether there are numbers.
(3) Whether ‘easy’ arguments for the existence of numbers work.
The core of my reply to Thomasson is that (1), (2) and (3) are different issues,
different questions, which can be addressed independently. The difference between
asserting the literal and the real content of a sentence like ‘‘the number of dragons is
zero’’ is that when we assert the real content of that sentence we only address issue
(1), leaving issues (2) and (3) open, whereas when we assert the literal content we
also address issue (2) (and perhaps 3). The difference between the literal and the
real content is a difference in the issues they address or target.
This reply does not prejudicate the possibility of a positive answer to issue (3)
and hence (2), and in this sense it is deflationist-friendly. The reply just
distinguishes the topics, or subject matters, of our assertive utterances.
To see the point, consider the situation in which you want to remain neutral about
the existence of numbers or the deflationist–fictionalist dispute about what follows
analytically from what, but are willing to commit yourself to the claim that there are
no dragons. It should be possible to say something that addresses only issue (1) and
not issue (2) and (3).
Similarly, it should be possible to discuss whether a male individual is married or
not without thereby discussing the tougher question of which inferences are allowed
by our linguistic rules.
The latter question is tough, because sometimes it can be difficult to determine
which language we are actually speaking: whether the Thomassonian language in
which there is an analytic entailment between ‘‘there are n Fs’’ and ‘‘the number of
Fs is N’’ or the Fieldian language (Field 1984) in which there is no such entailment
(see Yablo 2014b, fn. 36).
True, analytical entailments are ‘‘supposed to reflect rules of use that introduce
the new terms to our vocabulary’’ (Thomasson 2013, p. 1037, italics mine), but this
does not mean that they make ‘‘the move from the uncontroversial claim to the
transformed claim truly trivial’’ (Thomasson 2013, p. 1037). Analytical implications
should not be billed as trivial implications, because even though analytical
implications are ‘‘supposed to reflect rules of use that introduce the new terms to our
vocabulary’’ whether they do ‘‘reflect the rules of use of our vocabulary’’ might be
disputed for many reasons. One was mentioned before: to the extent that it is unclear
what language we are speaking, it might be unclear which are the correct rules of
use of our vocabulary.
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Another reason might be the possibility of internal conflict between different
rules for the use of the world ‘‘number’’.4 Let me illustrate one way this could
happen. Numbers are taken by Thomasson as the referents of singular terms
introduced by a transformation rule that allow us to infer ‘‘the number of the Fs is
N’’ form ‘‘there are n Fs’’. Some follow Hilbert in taking consistency as the criterion
for truth and existence in mathematics. According to this account, one rule for the
use of the word ‘‘number’’ is that ‘‘numbers exist’’ is true if and only if our standard
arithmetical theory (say, Peano Arithmetic) is consistent. Suppose that this rule is
adopted together with the transformation rules endorsed by Thomasson. Suppose
PA turns out to be inconsistent. On the one hand, ‘easy’ arguments for the existence
of numbers would still lead us to the conclusion that numbers exist; on the other
hand, the Hilbertian criterion would lead us to reject the claim that numbers exist.
Of course, even in this situation we could reject the Hilbertian criterion and retain
the usual transformation rules, or we could replace PA with a different, hopefully
consistent, theory. But I don’t see why this choice would be mandatory. The
inconsistency of PA could equally well be taken to indicate that there is no standard
model of arithmetic and hence no numbers (perhaps there are ‘‘schnumbers’’,
number-like objects; but that’s a different question).
So here are the reasons why I am reluctant to claim that numbers exist: for all I
know, our standard arithmetical theory might be inconsistent; for all I know, the
language I am speaking might not be governed by the kind of transformation rules
employed in the easy arguments for the existence of numbers; for all I know, there
might not be infinitely many objects.5 In order to claim that there are numbers, or
that there really is a number numbering the dragons, I should be in a position to
reply to all these challenges, and I am not. On the other hand, I am in a position to
claim that there are no dragons, because I can rule out that there are some dragons.
I am not saying that the challenges to the truth of ‘‘there are numbers’’ that I
mentioned are genuine. If PA is consistent, arguably the consistency of PA is a
necessary truth, so there is no possible world in which it is false that PA is
consistent. Similarly, it might be metaphysically necessary that there exist infinitely
many objects. The undisputed claim might analytically entail the ontological one.
The deflationist story might indeed be fully correct. Easy arguments might really
provide an answer to the question whether numbers exist. But I am not endorsing
this answer when I utter the sentence ‘‘there are no dragons’’. Similarly, when I
focus only on the real content of a typical number sentence, I simply do not address
the issue of whether numbers exist. The literal and the real content are different
because they concern different subject matters.
4 That a word might be associated with a cluster of rules, rather than just one rule, is a point stressed by
Putnam (1965). Evnine (2016) calls this point ‘the problem of too much content’ and uses it to raise a
challenge to easy arguments for the existence of mereological fusions. See also Button (2016).
5 The kind of transformation rules endorsed by Thomasson allow us to prove that, for every N, there must
be objects Fs such that the number of the Fs is N. 0 is the number of non-self-identical things (given that
there are no such things) and if N is a number of some Fs, N ? 1 is the number of the numbers that are
smaller or equal to N, given that there are n ? 1 numbers between 0 and N.
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Thomasson might protest that it begs the question against her to assume that it is
possible to address issue (1) without addressing issue (2). She says:
a speaker who is committed to the uncontroversial claim (the real content) is
thereby committed to the transformed claim (and to the ontological claim that
follows from it), even if she does not yet possess the new terms and concepts
employed in the transformed claim. (Just as a speaker who says ‘Hey, John is
an (eligible) unmarried man’ is committed to John’s being a bachelor, even if
she does not possess the term ‘bachelor’) (Thomasson 2013, pp. 1036–1037)
I sense an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘‘commitment’’ here. If P entails Q and I
assert P, what I said cannot be true unless Q is true. In this sense, if P (analytically)
entails Q and one asserts P, then one is committed to Q.
But there is also a sense in which commitment is connected to content: contents
can be taken to be the objects of commitment and speakers commit themselves to a
certain content by uttering a certain sentence only if they assert that content by
uttering the relevant sentence. This is the sense of commitment relevant to the
question at hand here. Thomasson challenged the fictionalist to distinguish the real
and the literal content of typical utterances of mathematical sentences. The
distinction the fictionalist is after is a distinction between contents. The fictionalist
needs to draw a distinction between the commitments a speaker incurs in asserting
the literal/real content only if there is a connection between content and
commitment.
If commitment is connected to content and if, as I am going to suggest, the
content of a sentence uttered in a certain context is connected to the topic or subject
matter the speaker is addressing in uttering such a sentence, then commitment is not
closed under (logical or metaphysical) consequence, even when we are dealing with
obvious consequences of what the speaker asserts. P obviously entails P v Q, but
asserting P one does not assert also P v Q (Yablo 2014a), because Q might be about
a topic upon which P is silent: P v Q is not part of what we say when say that P. In
any case, some entailment-relations are highly non-trivial. If Q is the Goldbach
conjecture and Q is true, then Q is necessarily true and hence any P entails Q. Still,
even in this case, a speaker asserting that there are no dragons should not be
interpreted as talking sides on the issue of the truth of the Goldbach conjecture.
In sum: an account of content that sees subject matter as a component of content
is able to distinguish two contents purely in terms of the topic they address, leaving
open whether the two contents are true in the same worlds or not. In order to make
my reply more precise, in the following I am going to provide an account of what
the subject matters or topics of a certain assertive utterance are and how two claims
can be distinguished not in terms of their truth-conditions, but in terms of the topics
they address.
5.1 Subject matters
I am going to explore the possibility for the hermeneutic fictionalist to hold that the
real and the literal content are true in the same situations, yet differ because they are
about different subject matters. I will say in a minute what subject matters are, what
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I mean by ‘content’ here and how to match a content with its subject matter, but let
me first give an informal illustration of the idea I want to propose here.
Consider the two sentences ‘‘Socrates exists’’ and ‘‘{Socrates} exists’’. On
standard assumptions, they are true in the same worlds. Yet, intuitively, they don’t
have the same meaning. One way in which they differ is this: the former is not about
sets in any way, whereas the latter is.
If the intensional content of a sentence (in a context) is identified with its truth
conditions (i.e. the sets of worlds in which it is true), the proposal here is to look at
the subject matter of a sentence as an additional component of its meaning beyond
its intentional content. The account developed by Yablo (2014a) can be presented as
an account of hyperintensionality based on the notion of aboutness, the relation
between a sentence and its subject matter.
Simplifying a bit, this is the account. Each sentence S is associated with a content
\|S|[which is a directed proposition. A directed proposition is the result of two
factors: a proposition |S|, conceived as a set of worlds, and a subject matter\S[,
conceived as the sum of two sets of propositions. |S| represents the truth conditions
of S, whereas\S[ is used to represent the reasons why S is true or false, also called
the truthmakers and falsemakers of S, which are conceived as propositions. So |S| is
the set of worlds where S is true and \S[, the overall subject matter of S, is
composed of two sets of propositions:\S?[, the subject matter of S, i.e. the set of
truthmakers of S and \S-[, the anti-subject matter of S, i.e. the set of its
falsemakers.
This account allows for the possibility of a difference in content that is not due to
a difference in truth-conditions. This is easily seen from a set-theoretical point of
view.\S?[is a covering of |S|, i.e. a family of sets such that the union of the sets in
the family is equal to |S|. But, in general, there can be different ways to cover a
region of logical space: two families of sets (of worlds) need not be identical in
order for their union to be identical. This amounts to the following:
\jS1 [ 6¼ \j jS2j[ ; jS1 6¼j jS2j
If we take S1 = ‘‘I am either tall or not tall’’ and S2 = ‘‘I am either rich or not rich’’,
we have two sentences which are true in the same worlds, but for different reasons.
In particular, the proposition I am rich belongs to the subject matter of S2, but not to
that of S1, in agreement with the intuition that the two sentences are about different
issues.
The account also allows us to define the notion of subject-matter-inclusion. To
simplify things I will consider only the case where S1 entails S2. In this case,\S1[
includes\S2[ if and only if each truthmaker of S2 is entailed by a truthmaker of S1
and each falsemaker of S2 is also a falsemaker of S1.
5.2 Ampliative inferences
The ontological deflationist holds that the existence of numbers can be established
via the following inference:




(b) The number of dragons = 0
;
(x) There are numbers
Contessa has recently argued that:
The fictionalist’s objection takes the form of a dilemma. Either the inference
from (a) [There are three apples on the table] to (b) [The number of apples on
the table is three] is ampliative or it is not. (Note that, here, I am using
‘ampliative’ in the sense in which it is used when, for example, we say that
deduction is a non-ampliative form of inference while induction is ampliative.
Informally, non-ampliative inferences are inferences ‘[whose] conclusions do
not contain any information that was not already contained in the premises’
(Swoyer 2014, ‘Arguments and Inferences’ Supplement, Section 2),while
ampliative inferences are inferences whose conclusion contains information
that was not already contained in the premisses.) If the inference from (a) to
(b) is indeed ampliative, then (b) contains some information that was not
already contained in (a), which means that the inference from (a) to (b) is not
trivial, after all—its conclusion contains more information than its premise. If,
on the other hand, the inference from (a) to (b) is non-ampliative, then
(b) cannot be used in settling the dispute between realists and antirealists about
numbers, for (b) cannot contain any information that was not already
contained in(a) and, if (a) is indeed uncontroversial (as the deflationist claims),
then it does not contain any information about the existence of numbers.
(Contessa 2016, pp. 766–767)
Thomasson has replied:
On the easy ontologist’s view, what’s really going on in the move from (a) to
(b) is not the introduction of new information, but the introduction of new
terms, in a new conceptual scheme, useful for new purposes. Number terms
may be introduced not to carry new ‘information’ about the world, but to
enable us to express and process the information we have in new, more
economical or efficient ways. Seen in this light, what (b) adds is not new
‘information’ but an addition to our conceptual scheme—a new sortal. That
new sortal, along with its rules of use, then entitles us to infer that there are
numbers. (Thomasson 2016, p. 6)
The distinction between subject matter and truth conditions opens up the possibility
of holding that the inference a therefore x (via b) can be ampliative in one sense
and not ampliative in another.
Assuming the correctness of the deflationist account, the inference from a to x is
not ampliative in the sense that all the worlds in which a is true are also worlds in
which x is true; if we measure the strength of an information in terms of the worlds
that are ruled out by it, a turns out to be stronger than x, given that it rules out more
worlds.
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The inference from a to x is ampliative in the sense that the the transition from a
to x brings in a new issue, with a corresponding change in subject matter. The
subject matter of a sentence is tied to the reasons why that sentence is true or false.
One way in which the subject matter of S2 can fail to be contained in that of S1 is
that S2 can be false for a reason that is different from the reasons why S1 can be
false.
S2 brings in a new falsemaker, not contemplated by S1. This is compatible with
S2 expressing a weaker proposition than S1.
Yablo (2014a, b, Ch. 7) has discussed something similar in connection with anti-
skeptical arguments. Consider an inference like:
(a) I have two hands
;
(x) I am not a BIV (brain in a vat)
‘‘I have two hands’’ is the kind of sentence we utter in ordinary contexts. In this
context, the falsemakers for ‘‘I have two hands’’ are: I have 0 hands, I have 1 hand, I
have 3 hands….
‘‘I am not a BIV’’, however, is the kind of sentence that is uttered in skeptical
contexts. The falsemaker for this sentence is: I am a BIV. This proposition is not
among the falsemakers of ‘‘I have two hands’’. The subject matter of ‘‘I am not a
BIV’’, then, is not contained in that of ‘‘I have two hands’’. This does not mean that
the proposition expressed by ‘‘I have two hands’’ does not entail that I am not a BIV.
Even though the subject matter of a does not contain that of x, the proposition
expressed by a cannot be true unless x is also true.
The inference from a to x brings in a new falsemaker for a: this does not mean
that we are now considering additional scenarios where ‘‘I have two hands’’ is false.
BIV worlds are some of the 0-hands worlds. The shift from ordinary to skeptical
contexts does not affect the truth conditions of ‘‘I have two hands’’: the proposition
is true (false) in the same worlds in both kinds of contexts. What changes are the
reasons why the proposition might be false: skeptical contexts pose a new challenge
to the truth of ‘‘I have two hands’’: the false maker I am a brain in a vat.
The hermeneutic fictionalist could maintain that something similar goes on with
respect to the inference (a) There are no dragons, therefore (b) the number of
dragons is zero, therefore (x) there are numbers.
a is about dragons: whether it is false or true depends on facts about the dragons.
Accordingly, the falsemakers for ‘‘there are no dragons’’ are: there is one dragon,
there are two dragons, there are three dragons and so on.
The falsemaker for x, i.e. ‘‘there are numbers’’ is the proposition there are no
numbers. This is not listed among a’s falsemakers, which means that the inference a
therefore x brings in a shift in subject matter. The proposition there are no numbers
exists even if it is necessarily true that numbers exist: in that case, the proposition is
simply the empty set. Even in this case, the set of the falsemakers of ‘‘there are no
numbers’’ (call it\x-[) would not be a subset of the set of the falsemakers of
‘‘there are no dragons’’ (\a-[).\x-[= {[}, but the empty set is not a member of
\a-[= {there is one dragon, there are two dragons, there are three dragons}. This
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shows that in order to distinguish between the subject matters of a and x we need
not assume that nominalistic worlds are possible. Even if nominalistic worlds did
not exist, their set (i.e. the empty set) could be used to represent the proposition that
there are no numbers, which would count as a falsemaker of x, but not of a.
This is not to say that the absence of nominalistic worlds does not pose any
problem. The claim, rather, is that such problems do not affect the substance of what
I am saying here, namely that it is possible to maintain that there are no numbers
belongs to the anti-subject matter of a directed proposition but not to the subject
matter of another directed proposition, while leaving it open whether there are
nominalistic worlds or not.6
The notion of subject matter helps also to elucidate the relation between a and b.
The full content of b includes among its falsemakers the proposition that there are
no numbers. The real content does not. So, as far as the inference from a to b is
perceived as unproblematic, this is because we focus not on the full content of b, but
only on the part of the content of b that is about the subject matter the concrete
world. This part is defined in such a way as to be identical to the content of a, in the
sense that the two contents not only have the same truth conditions, but also the
same subject matter. What ‘‘the number of dragons is zero’’ says about the concrete
world is that there are no dragons.
So the difference between committing oneself to the full content of a rather than
merely to its real content is a difference between the issues we address when
uttering a certain sentence.
6 Change of subject and believability
I have argued that the content of ‘‘there are no dragons’’ and ‘‘#dragons = 0’’ might
differ even if the two sentences were, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, true in
the same worlds. The two sentences would still differ in content because they
address different subject matters. This invites the following objection7:
6 Here is one problem. Yablo (2014a, b, Ch. 3) provides a method for constructing, given a sentence S
and a subject matter m, the part of S about m, Sm. One step in the construction says that the falsemakers
of Sm are those, among the falsemakers of S, that do not contain any world in which S is true about m.
Now, if there are no numbers is a falsemaker of S and there are no numbers is empty (a possibility I am
allowing), then it does not contain any world in which S is true about m, so it should count as a
falsemaker for Sm. But we do not want to count there are no numbers as a falsemaker for the part of S
about the concrete world. This can be fixed in various ways. Just to mention one, one can define the
falsemakers of Sm as the states that exclude the truthmakers of Sm, as in Fine (2015). If the absence of
numbers is an impossible state, then it is incompatible with every state, including the truthmakers of Sm.
Still, the absence of numbers arguably does not exclude any of the truthmakers of Sm, given that ‘‘two
states may be incompatible without either excluding the other, since it is also required that the excluding
state should be wholly relevant to the exclusion of the state that it excludes’’ (Fine 2015). The absence of
numbers is arguably not relevant for the exclusion of the truthmakers of Sm: if S = ‘‘the number of
dragons = 0’’, then the truthmaker of Sm is something like: the absence of dragons. The absence of
numbers is not wholly relevant to the exclusion of the absence of dragons: the presence of dragons is.
7 Thanks to an anonymous referee here.
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Granted that ‘‘there are no dragons’’ and ‘‘#dragons = 0’’ are about different
subject matters, why should we care? As long as we know that the two sentences are
true in the same worlds, believing one but not the other would be irrational. And if
the deflationist is right, we know that the two sentences are true in the same worlds.
So, even admitting that the contents of ‘‘there are no dragons’’ and ‘‘#dragons = 0’’
are different, if the deflationist is right it would be irrational to believe one content
and only quasi-believe the other, as the fictionalist recommends.
This is a natural objection. I have two replies to it.
First reply: I never said that we know that ‘‘there are no dragons’’ and
‘‘#dragons = 0’’ are true in the same worlds. I said that might be the case, but I also
mentioned some reasons to doubt that this is the case. As long as one doesn’t know
whether ‘‘there are no dragons’’ and ‘‘#dragons = 0’’ are true in the same worlds, it
might not be irrational for her to take different attitudes towards the contents of the
two sentences. True, I said that my account is deflationist-friendly, in the sense that
the way I propose to distinguish the literal and the real content is compatible with
the correctness of Thomasson’s account. But I never said we know that Thomasson
is right. On the contrary, I gave reasons to hold that, even if Thomasson is right, she
is not obviously right (Yablo 2014b, footnote 36). So the first reply is: the objection
presupposes that we know that ‘‘there are no dragons’’ and ‘‘#dragons = 0’’ are true
in the same worlds, but we don’t know that.
Second reply: sometimes we find harder to believe Q rather than to believe P
even though we recognize that P and Q are equivalent (true in the same worlds). For
instance it seems easier to believe that I have two hands rather than to believe that I
have two hands and I am not a BIV. The reason why believing that I have two hands
seems easier than believing that I have two hands and I am not a BIV might be that
(i) belief aims to knowledge and (ii) knowing that I have two hands is easier than
knowing that I have two hands and I am not a BIV. How can it be easier to know
that P than to know that Q if we recognize that P and Q are true in the same worlds?
One explanation is that when Q has a falsemaker not included among those of P, this
new falsemaker is ‘‘one more thing to be on the top of, in whatever sense of ‘‘on the
top of’’ you like’’ (Yablo 2014a, p. 119): we don’t know that Q because we are not
on the top of all its falsemakers.8 In sum: a change of subject matter might affect the
believability of a directed proposition because sometimes when the subject matter of
a proposition changes, its falsemakers change and we might no more be on top of all
of the falsemakers of the directed proposition.
7 Conclusions
Hermeneutic fictionalism is first and foremost an account of the content of typical
utterances of applied arithmetical sentences. I argued that HF can distinguish the
literal and real content in terms of the different subject matters associated to those
contents.
8 See Yablo (2014a, p. 119 fn. 6) for a list of possible definitions of ‘‘being on the top of’’.
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Of course, the account of content I sketched here is debatable, but Thomasson’s
challenge was to find an intelligible distinction between literal and real content, not
an unobjectionable distinction.
Moreover, let me make clear that the aim of this paper is to submit a new answer
to Thomasson’s challenge against fictionalism, not to argue that easy arguments are
incorrect. According to the account of content defended here, easy arguments
involve a shift in subject matter between the uncontroversial premise and the
ontological conclusion: this does not make them incorrect, but, contra Thomasson,
makes it intelligible how one can accept the premise of the argument while not
accepting its conclusion.
Let me also mention how viewing HF as a semantic theory based on the notion of
subject matter can illuminate other virtues of HF.
According to HF, in a typical utterance of an applied mathematical sentence like
S, speakers are not talking about the existence of numbers. This can be further
elaborated by saying that in ordinary uses of number-talk the existence of numbers
is presupposed rather than asserted. This seems to be confirmed by various linguistic
tests. One such test
is that presuppositions are preserved under denial. [….] To deny The number
of Martian moons is two, one says The number of Martian moons is not two,
not The number of Martian moons is not two, or else Mars doesn’t exist, or
there is no such thing as the number of its moons.
(Yablo 2014a, pp. 195–196)
Interpreting HF in the way proposed here also shows how the fictionalist can
account for the fact that in English it sounds redundant to say ‘‘there are no dragons
and the number of dragons is zero’’ (see Thomasson 2013, p. 1036). The reason why
it is so is that: ‘‘‘‘new information’’ should not in most cases be presupposed’’
(Yablo 2014a, p. 196)
If typical utterances of applied arithmetical statements presuppose the existence
of numbers, this explains why ‘‘there are no dragons and moreover the number of
dragons is zero’’ sounds bad: the only ‘new information’ that ‘‘the number of
dragons is zero’’ adds to ‘‘there are no dragons’’ is presupposed rather than asserted.
Another way to put the same point is to say that the only content that ‘‘the number of
dragons is zero’’ adds to ‘‘there are no dragons’’ is actually not asserted in typical
utterances of ‘‘the number of dragons is zero’’.9
To recap. I proposed a reply to Thomasson’s objection to HF that has two virtues:
(a) it is deflationist-friendly, (b) it helps us seeing HF for what it really is: an
account, based on the notion of subject matter, of the meaning of typical utterances
of sentences belonging to certain areas of discourse.10
9 Contessa (2016, p. 768) makes a similar point.
10 I did not address this issue here, but I also think that understanding HF as a semantic thesis allows us to
tolerate nominalistic worlds more easily, at least when discussing semantic notions like that of subject
matter. Nominalistic worlds might not be metaphysically possible, but they are concretely possible,
possible relative to how the concrete world is (Yablo 2014a, Appendix to Chapter 5). Relatively possible
worlds have their place in semantics: ‘‘If a philosopher could find arguments that in the best metaphysical
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